How the Indian Air Force Would Neutralize Pakistan’s Air Defence Network: A RAND-Style Assessment of “Operation Sindor”

 How the Indian Air Force Would Neutralize Pakistan’s Air Defence Network: A RAND-Style Assessment of “Operation Sindor”

An analytical assessment of how the Indian Air Force could dismantle Pakistan’s integrated air defence system using electronic warfare, stand-off weapons, and network-centric operations under a Sindor-type campaign.

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Executive Summary

In a high-intensity India–Pakistan conflict, control of the air domain would be decisive. Analytical war-gaming and post-2019 assessments suggest that the Indian Air Force (IAF) would prioritize rapid neutralization of Pakistan’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) through a combination of electronic warfare, stand-off precision strikes, and command-and-control disruption. Often referenced in strategic simulations as “Operation Sindor,” such a campaign reflects modern airpower doctrine rather than a publicly acknowledged operation.

This article examines—at a strategic and non-tactical level—how the IAF could systematically degrade Pakistan’s air defence network in the opening phase of a conflict.

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Pakistan’s Integrated Air Defence System: Strengths and Vulnerabilities

Pakistan’s air defence architecture is layered but heterogeneous, drawing from multiple foreign suppliers:

·         Long- and medium-range SAMs: Chinese-origin HQ-9 and HQ-16 families

·         Short-range systems: LY-80, FM-90, and MANPADS

·         Early warning assets: Ground-based radars supplemented by fighter datalinks

·         Interceptor force: F-16 and JF-17 aircraft integrated into the air defence network

While layered, this system remains highly radar-centric and centrally coordinated, creating potential single points of failure—particularly at the level of command nodes, data fusion centers, and radar emissions.

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Phase I: Electronic Warfare and Sensor Degradation

Contemporary IAF doctrine emphasizes soft-kill effects before kinetic engagement. In a Sindor-type scenario, the initial objective would be to degrade Pakistan’s situational awareness, not immediately destroy launchers.

Key enablers include:

·         Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C): Netra and Phalcon platforms

·         Electronic attack measures: Radar jamming, deception, and signal saturation

·         Spectrum dominance: Forcing Pakistani sensors to operate with incomplete or misleading data

The strategic goal is to create temporary gaps and uncertainty in radar coverage, allowing follow-on operations without requiring total physical destruction of air defence assets.

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Phase II: Stand-Off Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

Rather than penetrating heavily defended airspace, the IAF’s modernization trajectory favors long-range precision engagement.

Likely strike concepts include:

·         SCALP cruise missiles launched from Rafale fighters, enabling deep strikes without exposing pilots

·         BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles carried by Su-30MKI aircraft, compressing enemy reaction timelines

·         Anti-radiation weapons, designed to home in on active radar emissions

This approach reflects a broader shift toward cost-imposition strategies, where defending forces are forced to either emit (and be targeted) or remain silent and blind.

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Phase III: Network and Command Disruption

Modern IADS effectiveness depends less on individual missile batteries and more on network integration. Analytical models indicate that the IAF would prioritize:

·         Command-and-control headquarters

·         Data relay and communications infrastructure

·         Sensor fusion and battle management nodes

By targeting these elements, air defence units become isolated, unable to coordinate with interceptors or receive early warning data. This transforms a national air defence system into fragmented local defenses with sharply reduced effectiveness.

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Air Superiority and Escalation Control

Throughout such an operation, airborne surveillance platforms would play a critical role in battle management. Persistent AWACS coverage enables:

·         Early detection of Pakistani fighter responses

·         Efficient allocation of escort and defensive counter-air missions

·         Deterrence of escalation through credible beyond-visual-range engagement capability

The objective is not airspace saturation, but air dominance through information superiority.

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Lessons from Post-2019 Assessments

Analyses following the 2019 India–Pakistan crisis highlighted several trends relevant to Sindor-style planning:

·         Air defence reaction times remain vulnerable to stand-off weapons

·         Centralized control structures increase systemic fragility

·         Electronic warfare has an outsized impact relative to its cost

These findings reinforce the logic of prioritizing systems disruption over attrition.

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Strategic Implications

If executed effectively, a Sindor-type campaign could enable the IAF to:

·         Sever Pakistan’s early warning and tracking capability

·         Establish protected air corridors for follow-on strike missions

·         Achieve localized air dominance within the first 24–48 hours of conflict

From a strategic perspective, this would significantly shape escalation dynamics and bargaining leverage in any limited war scenario.

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Conclusion

Modern air warfare is increasingly defined by who controls the electromagnetic spectrum and decision cycle, rather than who fields the most launchers or aircraft. The Indian Air Force’s evolving doctrine—emphasizing electronic warfare, network disruption, and stand-off precision—reflects this reality.

In such a framework, destroying air defence systems is less about physical annihilation and more about denying the adversary the ability to see, decide, and respond.